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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-------------.
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.
16195

DAVID J. GRIFFITHS
and JACK I. DEAL,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants were charged with and convicted of
theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended, in the Sixth Circuit
Court, Tooele County, State of Utah.

They were also

charged by Information and convicted of burglary, a third
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202(1)
(1953), as amended, in the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Tooele County, State of Utah.

Prior to the

burglary trial, appellants entered a plea of once in
jeopardy, which was denied.

It is from the burglary

conviction that appellants appeal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants were charged on October 11, 1978,
in the Sixth Circuit Court, Tooele County, State of
Utah, with theft, a class B misdemeanor in violation
of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1953), as amended; and
burglary, a third degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1953), as amended.

They were

subsequently convicted on October 20, 1978, of the
class B misdemeanors in the Sixth Circuit Court.

On

that same day, probable cause was found and the
appellants were bound over to the Third Judicial
District Court for trial on the burglary charges.
On October 23, 1978, an Information charging the
appellants with the aforesaid burglary was filed by
the Tooele County Attorney.

Not guilty pleas were

entered and a jury trial set for Tuesday, November 21,
1978.
On November 13, 1978, appellants' motion
to withdraw their not guilty plea and enter a plea
of once in jeopardy was granted.

On November 16,

1978, a hearing on the once in jeopardy plea was
conducted by the district court and said plea was

-2-
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denied.

A subsequent motion by appellants to vacate

the trial setting was denied.

A further written motion

to vacate the trial setting was filed by appellants
the day before trial.

This too was denied.

On November 21, 1978, appellants were tried
on the burglary charge by a jury and found guilty as
charged in the Information.
Appellants were sentenced on the burglary
charge to an indeterminate term of zero to five years
in the Utah State Prison.

A stay of execution was

issued pending an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
Appellant Griffiths was sentenced on the
class B misdemeanor to pay a fine of $250 and serve
60 days in Tooele County Jail.

The jail sentence was

stayed and appellant was placed on probation for a
period of six months.
Appellant Deal was sentenced on the class B
misdemeanor to serve 120 days in the Tooele County Jail.
60 days of the jail sentence was stayed and the appellant
placed on probation with the Adult Probation and Parole
for a period of six months to serve 60 days in the Tooele
County Jail.

-3-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment
of the district court below convicting appellants of
burglary.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the night of October 10, 1978, at
approximAtely 10:25 p.m., the dispatcher in the Tooele
City Police Department received a call informing her
that the burglar alarm at the Cottage Market, a "7-11
type store,• was ringing (District Court Record 10).
She immediately dispatched Deputy Douglas Broadway of
the Tooele County Sheriff's Department to the scene
(D.C.R. 11).

Upon arriving at the Cottage Market at

10:31 p.m., Deputy Broadway observed a Blue Datsun parked
next to the market (D.C.R. 13).

The vehicle was occupied

by the appellants (D.C.R. 13), Jack Deal sitting behind
the driver's wheel in the front seat, David Griffiths
sitting on the passenger's side in the front
The motor of the vehicle was running
appellants were

i~ediately

(D.C.R. 15).

(D.C.R. 18).

The

ordered out of the vehicle

and placed on the ground in the parking lot (D.C.R. 14,
15).

At this time Officer Morgan of the Tooele Police

Department arrived with his dog, and along with Deputy
Broadway, ascertained that a third person was still
inside the Cottage Market (D.C.R. 15, 16).

This third
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person, Scott Byrd, was ordered out of the Cottage Market
by Deputy Broadway (D.C.R. 16).

Byrd exited through a

window which he later admitted breaking prior to his
entry (D.C.R. 17,33).

The three men were placed under

arrest, handcuffed, and transported to Tooele (D.C.R. 18).
Deputy Broadway then discovered on the ground
between the building and the Datson several items of
jewelry, rings, a small screwdriver set, and a can of
beer (D.C.R. 18).

Also found in the Datsun were several

cartons of cigarettes and a large quantity of beer
(D.C.R. 18, 19).

The items were identified by Mary

Norris, Manager of the Cottage Market, as items carried
by the store in inventory.

Such items were found to be

missing from the Cottage Market immediately subsequent
to the night of October 10, 1978 (D.C.R. 24,26,27).
At trial, testimony by Scott Byrd revealed
that Jack Deal, one of the appellants, received the
cigarettes and beer taken from the store by Byrd and
placed them in the Datsun (D.C.R. 37).

Appellant

Griffiths was present while this transaction was
occurring.

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Testimony by Byrd also revealed that earlier
in the evening of October 10, 1978, prior to the
incident when the arrests were made, all three men had
driven to the Cottage Market, where Byrd broke into the
building through a window (D.C.R. 37).

At that time,

Deal and Griffiths were allegedly sleeping in the
backseat of the Datsun (D.C.R. 37).

The burglar alarm

apparently went off while Byrd was inside, Deal drove the
car around the building and picked Byrd up in the Datsun,
and all three sped off towards Salt Lake City (D.C.R. 37).
A few minutes later, Byrd persuaded appellant
Deal, who was driving, to turn the vehicle around and
return to the Cottage Market (D.C.R. 37), at which time
the second entry into the Cottage Market was made.

Byrd

initially alleged that he told Deal and Griffiths that
he wanted to return to the Cottage Market to retrieve
a coat he had left behind.

Byrd's testimony, however,

revealed that he did not have a coat on that occasion, nor
did Griffiths or Deal (D.C.R. 38).
Appellants were subsequently convicted of theft,
a class B misdemeanor, in the circuit court, and burglary,
a third degree felony, in the district court.

The trial

in the district court was before a jury, with the

-6- by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding.

Pleas of

once in jeopardy were made following the theft conviction in the circuit court prior to preliminary hearing
on the felony charge, and again prior to the actual trial
in district court.

Said pleas were denied each time

(Circuit Court Record 67-72: District Court Record,
Transcripts of Proceedings of November 16, 1978, 1-17).
Following denial of the once in jeopardy pleas, appellants
filed a motion to vacate the trial setting for the purpose
of filing a writ of prohibition (D.C.R. 29).

Such motion

was filed the day before trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
NEITHER THE DISTRICT COURT NOR THE
CIRCUIT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE BURGLARY
CHARGE ON THE GROUNDS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
Following their conviction for theft in the
circuit court, appellants moved the circuit court to
dis~iss

the preliminary hearing on their burglary charge

on the grounds of once in jeopardy.

This motion was

denied (Circuit Court Transcript, 67-72).

Following

their arraignment in district court on the same charge
and prior to the jury trial, appellant's again moved for
dismissal of the third degree felony charge of burglary
on the grounds of once in jeopardy pursuant to Utah Code
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
-7-by the Utah State Library.
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Ann. S 76-1-402(2) (1953), as amended.

This too was

denied (District Court Record, Transcript of Proceedings
November 16, 1978, 1-17).
Appellants now file this appeal and contend
that the district court was barred from trying them
on the third degree felony charge on the grounds of
once in jeopardy.

The basis for their argument is

centered around Utah Code Ann. S 77-21-31(1)
amended, and Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(2)

(1953), as

(1953), as

amended, which according to appellants, give the district
court jurisdiction on the facts of this case to initially
try both the class B misdemeanor and third degree felony.
Since the appellants were tried and convicted on the class
B misdemeanor in circuit court, their argument is that
the statutory provisions of Section 76-1-402(2) regarding
double jeopardy apply (since both offenses should allegedly
have been tried in the district court), thereby precluding
trial on the third degree felony in the district court.
Respondent submits that appellants' argument
has previously been presented to the Utah Supreme Court
and rejected, and that Section 77-21-31(1) is a procedural
statute, not intended, when read in conjunction with

Sectio~

76-1-402(2), to allow the district court to initially
try class B

misde~eanors.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
AT BAR COME WITHIN THE BOUNDS
AND LEGAL REASONING SET FORTH
BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN
STATE V. COOLEY, THEREBY
PRECLUDING TRIAL OF A THIRD
DEGREE FELONY AND A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR INITIALLY IN THE
DISTRICT COURT.

Appellant argues that the facts in the case
of State v. Cooley, 575 P.2d 693 (Utah 1978), are
distinguishable from those in the present case, thereby
precluding the Cooley case from being within the ambit
of Section 77-21-31(1).

Respondent submits that the

facts in both the Cooley case and the case at bar are
extremely similar and that the law set forth in Cooley
is applicable to the facts of the present case.

Further-

more, Section 77-21-31(1) is a procedural statute dealing
with forms of pleading, not with jurisdiction of offenses,
and for this reason has no bearing on the Cooley case or
the case at hand.

1

In State v. Cooley, supra, the appellant was
arrested and given two citations.

One was for failing

1

Appellant seemingly agrees with respondent that the
facts of the Cooley case are not governed by Section
77-21-31(1), but for different reasons. Appellant
contends that the offenses in Cooley, though constituting a single criminal episode, were " • • • not
of the sa~e or sinilar character, . . • are not based
on the sa~e act or transaction or two or more acts or
transactions connected together . . . [and] do not
constitJtc pLirts of a common sche~e." Appellants'
Sponsored bric:,
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
p. Law
13.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
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to stop his motor vehicle at the command of a police
officer, an indictable misdemeanor; the other was
for two offenses, viz:

(a) driving with an improper

license and (b) having no tail light on a boat trailer
attached to the motor vehicle, both class B

misdemea~~rs.

The defendant pleaded guilty before a Justice
of the Peace to the charges of no driver's license and
no tail light and paid the fines.

When arraigned on the

charge of failing to stop at the command of a police
officer, he pleaded once in jeopardy pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. S 76-1-402(2)

(1953), as amended.

That

section provides:
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in
a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish
separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise
orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials
for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within
the jurisdiction of a single
court, and
(b) The offenses are known to
the prosecuting attorney at the time
the defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
Appellant contended in Cooley that since the
citations were issued at the same time (conduct

establishi~=

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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separate offenses under a single criminal episode), he
could not be charged with the indictable misdemeanor of
failure to stop his motor vehicle at the command of a
police officer, since the prosecuting attorney knew of
all the charges when they were made before the Justice
of the Peace Court.

The district court argued and

dismissed the information.

The State appealed pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4 (1)

(1953), and the Utah

Supreme Court reversed, remanding the case back to the
district court for trial on the merits.
In its opinion, the Court observed that the
two charges before the Justice of the Peace were
class B misdemeanors, triable before the Justice of the
Peace on a complaint,

2

while the charge of failing to

stop his vehicle at the command of a police officer was
an indictable misdemeanor triable only on information or
indictment in the district court.

3

2

The Court cited Spangler v. District Court of Salt Lake
County, 104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755 (1943).

3

In support of this proposition, the Court cited Article
VII, § 7 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. S
77-16-1 (1953), as amended, which respectively were cited
as follows:
"'The District Court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not
excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law.'"
[Emphasis added.)
The Legislature did provide by law the
following:
"All public offenses triable in the district
courts, except cases appealed from justices' and city courts,
must be prosecuted by information or indictment . • . • "

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Court thus concluded that the two different
classifications of misdemeanors (indictable and class B)
could not be tried together since statutory law proscribed
that class B misdemeanors be tried in the Justice of the
Peace courts while indictable offenses be tried in the
district courts:
It thus is evident that the
provisions of u.c.A., 1953, 76-1-402
(2) (a) relating to a single criminal
episode does not apply for the reason
that the crime of failinf to stop a
vehicle at the command o a police
officer cannot be tried in the same
court where the other two cr~mes
must be tr~ed.
575 P.2d at 694 (emphasis added).
In the case at hand, appellants allege that
the facts in the Cooley case are distinguishable from
those in the present case because the Cooley facts do
not come within the purview of Section 77-21-31(1),
whereas the instant facts do.

Section 77-21-31(1) reads:

Two or more offenses may be charged
in the same indictment or information in
a separate count for each offense if the
offenses charged, whether felonies or
misdemeanors or both, are of the same
or similar character or are based on the
same act or transaction or on two or more
acts or transactions connected together
or constituting parts of a common scheme
or plan.
Appellants say in their argument that the offenses
involved in Coolev, i.e., failing to stop a motor

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vehicle at the command of a police officer, driving
with an improper license, and having no tail light
on a boat trailer attached to a motor vehicle, though
constituting a single criminal episode, are •.
~

of the same or similar character • • • are not

based on the same act or transaction or two or more
acts or transactions connected together
do~

[and]

constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.•

See Appellant's Brief, p. 13.

Thus, appellants imply

that the Utah Supreme Court decided the Cooley case as
it did because the offenses involved did not meet the
criteria of Section 77-21-31(1).
Respondent strongly submits otherwise.

The

Court specifically declared the reason that the case
was decided as it was, that being that all the crimes
involved could not by statute have been tried in the
same court (see 575 P.2d at 694), thus the inapplicability
of Section 76-1-402(2) (a).

No mention was made by the

Court of Section 77-21-31(1), not because, as appellants
say, the criteria of Section 77-21-31(1) were not met
by the facts, but because Section 77-21-31(1), being a
procedural statute, had no bearing whatsoever on the
question of jurisdiction of the offenses involved.
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Respondent further submits that the facts
of the present case fall squarely within the purview of
Cooley.

In both cases class B misdemeanors were tried

in the Justice of the Peace court (circuit court in
present case).

In both cases indictable offenses

were charged (indictable misdemeanor in Cooley: third
degree felony in the present case).

In both cases the

offenses involved were separate offenses arising out of
a single criminal episode.

Thus, the reasoning and

result in Cooley should be applied in the present case,
thereby sustaining the position of this Court that class
B misdemeanors pursuant to statutory law and case law,
cannot be initially tried in the district courts.
Finally, Section 77-21-31(1) has no applicability
to the present case since both offenses cannot, pursuant
to State v. Cooley, supra, and statutory law (see Point
C, infra), be tried in the same court initially.
B.
THE CASE OF HAKKI V.
FAUX PRECLUDES THE TRYING
OF CLASS B MISDEMEANORS IN
THE DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT
INVOKING THE PROPER PROCEDURE.

Appellants' claim that both the class B
misdemeanor and the third degree felony should have
been tried initially in the district court is expressly

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rebuked in the case of Hakki v. Faux, 16 Utah 2d 132,
396 P.2d 867 (1964), which was cited by the Utah
Supreme Court in the Cooley case.
In Hakki, the plaintiff had been charged
with a nonindictable misdemeanor in a complaint filed
in the district court.

The district judge thought he

could try the case and in order to prevent his doing
so, the defendant (plaintiff on appeal) brought a
writ of prohibition against any further proceeding in
the district court on the complaint

filed therein.

In granting the writ, the court held that the proper
procedure to bring a nonindictable misdemeanor before
the district court was not followed:
Concluding, as we must, in the
light of statutes and case authority
that the proper procedure for invoking
the original jurisdiction of the
District Court has not been followed,
the District Court was powerless to
act in this matter. The Writ of
Prohibition lies to prevent the judge
from proceeding with the trial. It
is so ordered.
396 P.2d at 869.

The Court in Hakki seemingly further said that
where a nonindictable misdemeanor charge was originally
filed in the District Court, and the proper procedure
to invoke the jurisdiction was not followed and could
not be followed, jurisdiction to initially try the case
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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waa thereby precluded.

The Court followed the reasoning

aet forth in State v. Telford, 93 Utah 228, 72 P.2d
~26

(1937), and State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d

1034 (1941).
In Telford, there was an improper transfer of
a misdemeanor to the District Court.

There, the Court

said:
The district court should not
have proceeded with this case. A
tribunal may have jurisdiction o? a
sUbject matter but the ri~ht to
proceed under that jurisd~ction
may depend on a condition precedent.
Put in another way, the court may
have jurisdiction of a subject
matter but its jurisdiction should
be properly invoked.
There are many cases where
courts have jurisdiction of a subject
matter but that jurisdiction must be
invoked according to a certain
procedure • • • in the case of
misdemeanors, the jurisdiction of
the district court can be invoked in
two ways only: First, by appeal; .
second, if it appears by the
certificate that there is no justice
of the peace in the county qualified
to try the case • • •

*

*

*

The district court itself should
refuse to proceed if the certificate
shows it is not an appeal, or that it
is not shown that there are no justices
of the peace in the county qualified to
try the case • . • •
72 P.2d at 627-628 (emphasis added).
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In the Johnson case, the defendant was initially
charged with a misdemeanor in the district court.

A question

was presented as to whether the district court had jurisdiction to initially try the case:
This presents the question of the
construction of Article VIII, Section 7
of .the State Constitution, which as far
as involved here reads: "The District
court shall have oriainal jurisdiction in
all matters civil an criminal, not
excepted in this Constitution, and not
prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction
from all inferior courts and tribunals,
and a supervisory control of the same
n

114 P.2d at 1036.

The Court went on to answer its question as to
the meaning of "original jurisdiction" as set forth in
Article VIII, Section 7 of the State Constitution:
Does this provision mean that any_
civil or criminal matter not expressly
prohibited by law may be commenced, in the
first instance, in the district court
regardless of statutory provisions
providing another forum where certain cases
must be commenced and may them come to the
district court by appeal? In other words
what is the meaning of the term original
jurisdiction? Does it refer to the locus
or situs of the initial instigation of a
legal controversy or does it refer to the
nature of the adjudicative power of the
tribunal? Does it refer to the tribunal
where the processes invoking juridicial
action must emanate or be filed in the
first instance; or does it define the form
and extent of the juridicial power? We
have no hesitancy in saying it is the latter.
114 P.2d at 1036.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A distinction between "original" and "appellate
juriadiction• was made by this Court in the Johnson case.
Following this excellent treatise and history on such a
diatinction, the Court espoused its interpretation and
meaning of Article VIII, S 7 of the State Constitution
in light of the jurisdictional issue:

*

*

*

A power to constitute courts is a
power to prescribe its powers and the
mode of trial, and consequently if nothing
is said in the Constitution to the contrary, the legislature would be at
liberty to prescribe what cases should
be tried therein. The specification of
an obligation that all criminal cases
may be tried in the District Court does not
abridoe the power of the leoislature to
orovide that some must be commenced and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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·ust tried in another tribunal. The
leg1slature may generally rrescr e
the methods or means by wh ch the
~urisdiction of the courts may be
1nvoked in the absence of constitutional
limitations.
(Emphas1s added).

* * *
By giving the inferior courts
jurisdiction of specific classes of
cases the legislature did not limit
the jurisdiction of the district courts,
but conditions precedent are interposed
to the exercise of such jurisdiction.
They may ultimately have the question
tried before them on appeal, and a
decision by a district court in a case
brought before it from a justice of the
peace or city court is final • • • the
higher court has the power to hear the
matter in controversy but the inferior
court is the proper one to just take
cognizance of the matter. If, however,
there is not a qualified inferior
tribunal to hear the cause, upon proper
showing of this fact the district court
will exercise its inherent power and
assume jurisdiction over the cause . . .
(Emphasis added) .

*

*

*

Since the legislature has laid
down a certain procedure for invoking
the jurisdiction of the district courts
this procedure must be followed.
(Emphasis added).

*

*

*

While the District Court has
general jurisdiction in all criminal
matters, the proper procedure in misdemeanor cases as prescribed by statute
is to commence the action in the city
or justice's court . . .
114

P.2d at 1035, 1039, 1040, 1042 (emphasis added).
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It is readily apparent that the Hakki courts based
its decision to a large extent on the reasoning set forth
in State v. Johnson, supra:
• • • . The opinion very clearly
develops the thesis that original
jurisdiction" as used in the Constitution
does not mean that an action must be
originally brought in the court having
original jurisdiction, nor that there is
a right originally to initiate it in
that court. The word "original" expresses
an adjudicative power of the court to
function originally in regard to the
litigation, independently of another
tribunal, as it could have done if
originally brought in that court and
not as a court reviewing the action of
another tribunal. I think the distinction
sound and the only one workable under
the various provisions of our constitution.
Hakki, supra, at 396 P.2d 869, quoting from Justice Wolfe's
concurring opinion in State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d at 1043.
Respondent thus submits that in the present case
the District Court was powerless to try the class B
misdemeanor initially because of the reasons set forth in
Hakki, Johnson, and Telford cases.

The jurisdiction of

the District Court to try the class B misdemeanor could have
been invoked in only one of two ways, neither way being
appropriate under the facts of the instant case.

The

initial trial was properly held in the Circuit Court.

-20Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

c.
S 77-21-31(1), UTAH CODE ANN.,
1953, AS AMENDED, DOES NOT CONFER
JURISDICTION ON THE DISTRICT COURTS
TO INITIALLY TRY A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR.
Article VIII, S 7, of the Utah Constitution confers
jurisdiction upon the District Courts to try all matters
civil and criminal which are not excepted in the State
Constitution and " • . • not prohibited by law: • • • •
[Emphasis added] .

The Utah Legislature has nprohibited by

law" the trying of certain cases initially in the District
Court through the enactment of various statutes.

The

Legislature has also proscribed the method by which a case
is to be initially presented and brought before the District
Court.

Section 77-16-1, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended,

provides:
All public offenses triable in the
district courts, except cases appealed from
justices and circuit courts, as well as
class A misdemeanors triable in circuit
courts, must be prosecuted by information
or indictment, . . .
Thus, if an offense is triable in the district court, it must
be brought by information or indictment, unless appealed
from a circuit or justice court.

In the instant case, the

class B misdemeanor was not appealed from the circuit court,
nor was it cresented by information of indictment, since
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Section 78-5-4, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, gives the
justice's courts jurisdiction to initially try all class

B misdemeanors punishable by certain fines and imprisonment
time:
(1) Justice's courts have
jurisdiction of the following public
offenses committed within the respective counties in which such
courts are established:
(a) All class B and class C
misdemeanors punishable by a fine
less than $300 or by imprisonment.
not exceeding six months, or by both
Section 77-57-2, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, makes it
mandatory that all proceedings and actions before a justice's
court for a misdemeanor be commenced by a complaint under
oath.

4

Thus, statutory laws herein cited specifically give

the circuit court judge in the present case the jurisdiction
ancauthority to try the class B misdemeanor of theft.
Respondent submits that

§

5

77-21-31 was enacted as

a procedural statute (it is located in the Rules of Pleading Forms of Information and Indictment Charter of Title 77 -

4

Section 78-4-16, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, gives
the city courts the same powers and jurisdiction in all
criminal actions as are or may be prescribed for justices
of the peace.
Section 78-4-16.5, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as
amended, gives authority for a complaint to be commenced
before a city court judge if such a complaint may be commenced before a Magistrate pursuant to § 77-57-2.

5

Section 76-6-412(1) (d) makes theft under§ 76-6-404 a
class B misdemeanor under the facts of the present case.
-22-
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Code of Civil Procedure), and was intended to be

used~

jurisdiction or venue of offenses had already been established.
For example, S 77-21-31(1) in conjunction with S 76-1-402(2),
would be used to prevent the prosecution from putting a
defendant through separate trials for several offenses (e.g.,
a second degree felony) , if the separate offenses were part
of the same act or transaction, etc.~ part of the same
criminal episode; and

of course, very important, under the

jurisdiction of a single court.
Finally, respondent submits that S 76-1-402(2)
is not applicable because of the aforestated reasons that the
third degree felony and class B misdemeanor are not initially
triable in the courts of the same jurisdiction.
POINT II.
BURGLARY AND LARCENY ARE TWO
OFFENSES, AND AS SUCH, ARE
SEPARATELY TRIABLE, EVEN THOUGH THEY
ARE IN THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE.
SEPAR~TE

Appellant, in Point II of his brief at pp. 14-15,
concedes that burglary and theft in the instant case are
two separate offenses.

Respondent further adds that because

of their jurisdictional problems which have heretofore been
discussed in Point I., such offenses are also separately triable,
though part of the same criminal episode.
As authority for the proposition that the offense
cf larceny and burglary are separate offenses, though part of
~~c

same

cri~inal

episode, resoondent refers the Court to
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the ca•e of State v. Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262

(1962)1 Rogerson v.Harris,l78 P.2d 397 (1947).

See also,

State v. Thatcher, lOB Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 (1945), which
hold• that a prosecution for an "act or omission" made
punishable by more than one statute did not bar a second
prosecution unless the acts or omissions charged were, as
a whole, the same: also, the fact that some of the acts or
omissions charged in the first prosecution were also elements
of the second offense was irrelevant.
In Rogerson, the Court stated:
In this case burglary and
larceny arose out of the same total
transaction but the proof of the
burglary stopped when the proof of
the larceny started. Entirely
different facts constitute the different crimes of which the plaintiff
was found guilty. The same facts
therefore do not constitute the two
crimes joined but different facts constitute
the different crimes of which the plaintiff
was found guilty. The same facts
therefore do not constitute the two
crimes joined but different facts constitute different crimes.
178 P.2d at 399.
In the instant case, the acts of Scott Byrd

were

imputed to the appellants under S 76-2-202, Utah Code Ann.,
1953, as amended, making them liable as principals, though
they were accomplices.

The appellants were present with

-2~-
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By_rd when he entered the Cottage Market the second time,
they knew he was going to enter, and one of the appellants,
Deal, drove Byrd to the situs.

The purpose with which

Byrd entered the store was a matter for jury determination.
Apparently the jury was convinced that the requisite
criminal intent for burglary was present.

It shall be

noted that the act of appellant Deal in "loading up• the
stolen goods in the car is reflective of his intent, as is
appe-::.lant Griffiths' acquiescence in being present and lending
support, never trying to escape the situation before it was
too late.

Respondent thus submits that the evidence was

sufficient to support the conviction, and no procedural
errors affecting appellant's due process occurred.
POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DID NOT
VIOLATE APPELLANTS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
Appellants argue that their due process rights
were violated by the actions of Judge Baldwin at the district
court hearing on the plea of once in

jeo~ardy

(1) allegedly argued the prosecution's case;

when he:
(2) allegedly

misapplied the law to the facts of the instant case;

( 3)

allegedly did not allow defense counsel to fully argue his
case;

( 4)

refused to vacate the trial setting in order that

defense counsel might attempt to obtain a writ of prohibition.
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Respondent submits that reason 2 above has been
heretofore arqued in this brief, and is submitted as such.

Aa to reasons 1 and 3, respondent submits the transcript
as support of the argument that Judge Baldwin did not
arque the case for the prosecution and did allow defense
counsel time and opportunity to argue his case.
Respondent calls the attention of the Court to
the colloquy on page 2 of the November 16, 1978, transcript,
whereby the County Attorney submitted its argument in opposition to appellant's once in jeopardy

pl~a

in the Cooley

case:
The Court: State of Utah vs. David
Griffith and Jack I. Deal. County Attorney
submitted it on a case he said he gave
to you, their position.

Mr. Young: Yes, your Honor. If he
is referring to the Cooley case, I
have a copy of that.
A thorough reading of the transcript reveals that Judge Baldwin
was well versed on the applicable case and statutory law,
and was merely pointing out to defense counsel such law
and the reasons he felt he was obliged to follow such law,
though he personally might have agreed with defense counsel's
position.

See November 16, 1978 transcript, pp. 10, 14, 16.

Appellants have made no argument as to how their due process
rights were affectPn

and cite no case or statutory authority.
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R~spondent

thus submits that the allegations made aqainat

Judge Baldwin are frivolous and merit no consideration
from this Court.
Respondent submits that Judqe Baldwin correctly
applied the law in the State of Utah to the facta at the
hearing on appellant's motion to dismiss
of once in jeopardy, on November 16, 1978.

on the ground&
As such,

respondent claims that there was no reason shown as to why
a writ of prohibition pursuant to Rule 65B(b) (4) should
issue, thus no reason to vacate the trial setting as requested
by appellants.

Aside and apart from that fact, however,

respondent submits that any error found by this Court to
have been committed by the District Court in refusing to
vacate the trial setting was harmless, since appellants have
an adequate remedy on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
Charrigan v. Bowman, 40 Utah 91, 119 P. 1037 (1911);
Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580 (1925).

Should

this Court find that the District Court should not have
tried the

third degree felony, the case will be dismissed

and no harm done, since the appellants have already suffered
embarrassment through their convictions of theft in the
circuit court.
Finally, respondent submits that a writ of
prohibition will issue to prevent an inferior court or
tribunal from exercising jurisdiction with which it had not
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been vested by law, or to arrest it from exercising want
or excess of legal jurisdiction, but not to prevent or
correct an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, which, if

this Court finds for appellants, would be the case.
v. Durand, 39 Utah 118, 115 P. 986 (1911).

Campbell

The District

Court having jurisdiction pursuant to Article VIII, S 7
of the State Constitution to try felonies, a writ of
prohibition would not have been proper, and any error in
exercising jurisdiction on a jeopardy matter could be argued
on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The District Courts do not have jurisdiction
to initially try class B misdemeanors.

Such is by

statute the jurisdictional duty of the city courts and
justices of the peace courts.

Felony cases must be

tr~ed

in the District Courts, thus th-ere is no possible way that
S 77-21-31(1) could have been applicable in the present case
because both cases could not have been initially tried in
the same court.
point.

The Cooley and Hakki cases substantiate this

Furthermore,

the same reason, viz:

§

76-1-402(2) is not applicable for

lack of jurisdiction to try both

offenses initially in the same court.
Appellants were charged with separate offenses
arising out of the same episode, which were separately
triable.
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Finally, no due process violations can be
substantiated in the record at the District Court hearing
on the jeopardy motion or at the trial itself.

For these

reasons, respondent requests that the District Court
judgment be affirmed.
Respectfully

submi~ted,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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